THE CHALLENGES TO COMPETITION OF PRICE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY MANUFACTURERS ON ONLINE RETAILERS

Abstract

The purpose of the paper was to study the legal features of maintaining the price of goods during resale. By this design, the author understands the agreement or concerted action of independent market participants on the establishment of a minimum or fixed price. The author argues that currently there is an increase in the number of online retailers who are dissatisfied with the fact that manufacturers indicate to them what minimum price should be set for the product or what advertised price to use. They believe that such recommendations hinder the realization of their competitive advantages, limiting the possibilities of offering lower prices for goods. On the other hand, manufacturers provide various rationales for price recommendations, for example, the desire to protect the image of a brand and the need to avoid cannibalization of traditional distribution channels with online stores. Procedure and research methods: the author used a comparative approach and modeling method. Results of the study: the author summarized the discussion of scientists and practitioners about whether manufacturers can influence retail prices by setting different wholesale prices for retailers depending on the intended product sales channel (traditional trade or via the Internet). Theoretical /practical value: the author argues that charging different (wholesale) prices from different retailers is generally considered as a normal element of competition. The use of a double pricing system for the same (hybrid) retailer is generally considered an explicit (classic) restriction according to VBER.